











Manuscript version: Author’s Accepted Manuscript 
The version presented in WRAP is the author’s accepted manuscript and may differ from the 
published version or Version of Record. 
 
Persistent WRAP URL: 
http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/114924                                                           
 
How to cite: 
Please refer to published version for the most recent bibliographic citation information.  
If a published version is known of, the repository item page linked to above, will contain 
details on accessing it. 
 
Copyright and reuse: 
The Warwick Research Archive Portal (WRAP) makes this work by researchers of the 
University of Warwick available open access under the following conditions.  
 
Copyright © and all moral rights to the version of the paper presented here belong to the 
individual author(s) and/or other copyright owners. To the extent reasonable and 
practicable the material made available in WRAP has been checked for eligibility before 
being made available. 
 
Copies of full items can be used for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit 
purposes without prior permission or charge. Provided that the authors, title and full 
bibliographic details are credited, a hyperlink and/or URL is given for the original metadata 
page and the content is not changed in any way. 
 
Publisher’s statement: 
Please refer to the repository item page, publisher’s statement section, for further 
information. 
 
For more information, please contact the WRAP Team at: wrap@warwick.ac.uk. 
 
Is allocation affected by the perception of others’
irresponsible behavior and by ambiguity?
Zvi Safra1, Sinong Ma2, Tigran Melkonyan1∗
March 10, 2019
1Warwick Business School, University of Warwick, Coventry, UK
2Warwick Manufacturing Group, University of Warwick, Coventry, UK
Abstract
The paper examines how the perception of others’irresponsible behavior and ambiguity re-
garding probabilities affect allocation among potential beneficiaries. To elicit these views,
we conducted a survey where the participants were first asked to make an allocation of a
fixed sum of money between a hereditary cancer, where chance plays a central role, and a
lifestyle-related cancer, where individual lifestyle decisions are more important. Our esti-
mation results show that a substantial share of the respondents allocates significantly more
to the hereditary cancer. This may indicate that these respondents care about others’irre-
sponsible behavior. Then, we elicited perceptions of cancer hazards in the form of imprecise
probabilities and examined the interplay between allocating behavior and risk perceptions.
Finally, we investigated the effects of various socio-economic characteristics, and of awareness
of highly-publicized cancer cases, on respondents’allocations.
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tions
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1 Introduction
Although risk has many facets, most research and applications related to the measurement of
risk focus only on two key dimensions: the set of possible consequences and their likelihoods.
Notable exceptions are Gardoni and Murphy (2014) who, following Keller and Sarin (1988),
argue that ethical and moral considerations should also play a key role in the evaluation and
comparison of diverse risks. Gardoni and Murphy expand the common definition of risk to
include a third dimension, the source of a risk, that reflects (i) causation and responsibility
for bringing about a hazard, (ii) whether the risk is voluntary and (iii) the relation between
the risk bearer and the party who caused the risk. These authors construct a scale of
risk as a multidimensional ranking, based on a comparative evaluation of the consequences,
probability, and source of a given risk. According to them, the more morally culpable
the source the higher the scale of the risk. Hansson (2016) echoes Gardoni and Murphy
by arguing that limited coverage of ethical issues is one of the fundamental weaknesses
of standard probabilistic risk analysis. He claims that risk analysis typically deals with
probabilities and consequences and neglects intentionality, responsibility and justice, which
are part of the ethics of risk-taking and risk imposition. One of the goals of the present
paper is to mitigate this neglect by contributing to our understanding of the responsibility
issue.
Another important facet of risk that is sometimes not a focus of attention in risk analysis
pertains to the uncertain nature of likelihoods of different consequences.1 Flage, Aven, Zio
and Baraldi (2014) observe that “a broader perspective is required to allow uncertainty
representations other than probability”. Understanding how individuals perceive ambiguity
and how this perception affect their behavior is another goal of this paper.
Next we review the relevant literature on responsibility and ambiguity, followed by a
short description of our research and its objectives.
1For notable examples where uncertainty of likelihoods is at the center stage, see, e.g., Curley, Yates,
and Abrams (1986) and Tversky and Fox (1995).
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1.1 Literature Review
Responsibility. Considerations related to individuals’ responsibility for bringing about a
hazard are at the center stage of health, financial, environmental and many other risks.
In health, a recent example is offered by a policy change in the operation of the National
Health System (NHS) in the United Kingdom. In 2014, the NHS Blood and Transplant
Service announced that it was changing its current policy by allowing people with severe
drink-related liver diseases to be considered for liver transplants (The Guardian, 2014).2
Many questioned the appropriateness of this decision mentioning that individuals who are
likely to have harmed their own health are not as deserving of treatment.
In fact, the debate regarding liver transplantation for alcohol abusers can be traced to at
least early nineteen-nineties, and one of the most notable exchanges of the time is offered by
Moss and Siegler (1991) and Cohen and Benjamin (1991), who provide diametrically opposite
views on the issue. More generally, for over 30 years the question of whether patients with
illnesses caused by own actions should receive lower priority in access to healthcare resources
has been at the centre stage of a heated debate involving prominent scholars from a variety
of disciplines. Although this debate is still largely unresolved, a considerable progress has
been made in understanding various forces shaping pros and cons of rationing healthcare
resources for individuals who may have contributed to their illnesses.3 Daniels (2008) and
Segall (2009), who offer opposing views, are notable examples in this debate. Segall char-
acterizes “disadvantages as being unjust ... [only] when they result from conduct or factors
that it would be unreasonable to expect the agent to avoid”(page 10). Daniels rejects at-
tempts at making “people bear the cost of risky lifestyle choices”(page 67) and advances a
number of arguments against it, including diffi culties associated with ascertaining individual
responsibility for health outcome and adverse consequences of intrusiveness, and liberty and
privacy infringement. Expanding on Daniels, Feiring (2008) distinguishes between backward-
2There are examples of changes in the opposite direction. In 2016 hospital leaders in North Yorkshire,
UK, announced that overweight patients and smokers will be prohibited from most standard hip and knee
surgeries for up to a year (The Telegraph, 2016).
3Sharkey and Gillam (2010) provide an insightful review of the debate surrounding the role of individual
responsibility in the allocation of healthcare resources. They identify and examine twelve arguments for and
against holding individuals responsible for the choices adversely affecting their health.
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and forward-looking responsibility. The former is associated with past choices and Feiring
voices doubts regarding the morality of holding people responsible for such choices. Instead,
she advocates a forward-looking view according to which individuals are asked to commit
to lifestyles that increase effi cacy of medical treatments. Schmidt (2009) advances another
approach that is compatible but wider than Daniels’. He puts forward a notion of health re-
sponsibility as co-responsibility, and advocates that it is more nuanced and less punitive than
holding people fully responsible for their actions. Schmidt also provides useful tests for the
applicability of his approach in health-care. More generally, Cappelen and Norheim (2005)
and Buyx (2008) argue that liberal egalitarianism, which also advocates co-responsibility
and emphasizes social solidarity, is preferable for setting rationing criteria for healthcare
provision.4
Responsibility for actions that adversely affect other individuals and private and public
property form a foundation of legal and regulatory systems in most societies (e.g., Shavell,
1984, Duff, 2007). Redistribution of income and wealth is another important area where
individual responsibility for poor choices frequently has a key role. Fong (2001) analyzes a
Gallup poll and finds that respondents care about responsibility. According to her findings,
“A strong taste for equity or reciprocity is consistent with the basic concept of insuring
industrious people against bad luck, but not providing unconditional assistance to the poor
if their condition is due to idleness.”Diverse views of how inadequate choices should influence
redistributive policies also reverberated during the most recent global financial crisis.5 While
some defended the use of government funds to help the troubled financial institutions on the
basis that the alternative was even worse, many individuals and interest groups vehemently
objected to it. Among them was a group of prominent professional economists who wrote to
the US Congress cautioning against a bailout of “particular investors and institutions whose
choices proved unwise”(Wolfers, 2008).
Ambiguity. Flage, Aven, Zio and Baraldi (2014) argue that interval of imprecise proba-
4See also, e.g., Friedman et al. (2007) and Gulyn and Youssef (2010), for attributions of blame in health
contexts and Bulman and Wortman (1977), Mikula (2003), and Shaver (2012) for general settings.
5Disagreements between experts regarding fairness are symptomatic of many other debates where both
luck and individual responsibility affect the probability distribution over possible outcomes.
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bilities can be a useful tool for representing uncertainty surrounding likelihoods of many
hazards, especially catastrophic events. At an individual level, such uncertainty is prevalent
for perceptions of many risks and, in particular, for those considered in the present paper.
Individuals form their perceptions about cancer incidence and its dependence on lifestyle
behavior based on a variety of sources, including popular media outlets and scientific pub-
lications. However, estimates coming from different sources, even scientific, are frequently
contradictory. For example, Tomasetti and Vogelstein (2015) estimate that the majority of
cancers are due to “bad luck” and are completely out of people’s control while Wu et al.
(2016) estimate that 70% to 90% of cancers are due to avoidable, extrinsic risk factors. Such
diversity of scientific estimates may prevent individuals from forming precise risk estimates
of their ability to prevent cancers. As a result, they may face ambiguity, a term used by
Ellsberg (1961), in the form of multiple probabilities of getting different cancers and associ-
ated outcomes (Han et al., 2006, 2007). A similar notion (under a different name) is a major
component of the probability dimension of Gardoni and Murphy’s scale of risk.
1.2 Research Strategy
The cases described in relation to responsibility clearly demonstrate that society members,
including policy makers, experts, scholars and the public, have different views regarding
responsibility. To understand these views and to see how to incorporate them into models
used in risk analysis and management we concentrate here, as a first step, on the general
public, and conduct the survey described below. It is also not completely clear how the
general public perceive ambiguity and to what extent this perception affects actual behavior.
Understanding these latter issues is the second task of this paper, which is also carried out
using the following survey.
(i) Responsibility. In order to understand how the general public relates to responsibility,
we used an online survey of a representative sample of UK respondents. In the first two
questions, the participants in our survey were told they were given a fixed hypothetical
charitable donation for research on cancer treatment/prevention, and were asked to split it
between two cancer types. The first was a hereditary cancer, where chance plays a central
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role (being caused by inherited, unobservable, genetic defects) and the second was lifestyle-
related cancer, where individual lifestyle decisions (like smoking and poor diet) are extremely
important.6 Since research benefits future victims of these cancers and since most victims
of the largely avoidable cancer have probably contributed to their situation, it is reasonable
to assume that the victims of the lifestyle-related cancer are perceived more responsible for
their situation (see Rickard 2014). Hence, a respondent who allocates equal amounts to both
cancer types seems not to care about these victims’perceived irresponsible behavior. On the
other hand, a respondent who allocates a smaller share to the lifestyle-related cancer might be
regarded as someone whose allocation is affected by the perception of others’perceived irre-
sponsible behavior. The survey’s third question had similar intent but asked about allocating
compensation between two individuals, who contracted lung cancer after being exposed to
a cancer hazard, taking into account that one of them was a heavy smoker. Finally, to find
out whether additional factors affect respondents’allocations, we elicited socio-demographic
and behavioral data including gender, education, income, smoking behavior, lifestyle quality
and others.
(ii) Ambiguity. In light of possible perceptions of uncertainty by the general public, we
also elicited the survey respondents’perceptions of ambiguity. Specifically, the respondents
were asked for their beliefs about hazards of various cancers and were allowed to choose
interval probabilities as their responses (Walley, 1991, Johnson and Slovic 1995, Flage et al.,
2014). The difference between the maximal and minimal likelihoods for each question, called
the degree of ambiguity, was used to measure a respondent’s perceived ambiguity about the
corresponding hazard (the higher the degree of ambiguity, the bigger is the perception of
ambiguity). To reduce complexity, we did not elicit beliefs regarding other risk factors, like
avoidance rate and survival rate. Moreover, and as mentioned above, even academics may
have large disagreements about the correct estimate of the former. Using our theoretical and
empirical models we then examine how these degrees of ambiguity may affect allocations.
Finally, perceptions of various cancer risks and associated behavior may be affected by
individuals’awareness of highly-publicized cases, especially when these involve public figures.
6In 2015, 72% of the risk of getting lung cancer in the UK was attributed to smoking (and 79% to all
lifestyle-related causes)
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In our empirical model, we also investigate how knowledge of such highly publicized cases
may affect perceptions of hazards associated with hereditary and lifestyle-related cancers,
and the resulting behavior.
1.3 Predictions
A series of laboratory experiments, which address the issue of social preferences by eliciting
willingness to make transfers to subjects who have taken risks compared to those who have
not (see, e.g., Cappelen, Hole, Sørensen and Tungodden, 2007, Cappelen, Sørensen and Tun-
godden, 2010, and Cappelen et al., 2013), suggest that a considerable share of the population
rewards responsibility. This result is also consonant with our companion paper (Melkonyan,
Safra and Ma, 2017) where we used naturally occurring data. Since a lifestyle-related can-
cer is affected by victims’behavior much more than a hereditary one, we expect very few
respondents to favor the former. Hence,
Prediction 1. Most respondents either allocate more to the hereditary cancer or allocate
equally.
In our companion paper we also found that sensitivity to responsibility was mainly driven
by women.7 Given this, we expect
Prediction 2. Allocating more to the hereditary cancer is more prevalent among women.
Rickard (2014) reports that the attribution of responsibility to accident victims was
more prevalent among people who acted responsibly. In the present work, this group is
identified with non-smokers. Hence, one might expect that the share of non-smokers who
donate more to the hereditary cancers will be greater than the corresponding share among
all respondents. A similar result might hold for respondents who report having healthy
lifestyles. Furthermore, in light of the existing studies that find a significant degree of self-
interest and in-group favoritism (see Sumner, 1906, Akerlof and Kranton, 2000, Rudman
and Goodwin, 2004 and Chen and Li, 2009), we expect some of the smokers to favor victims
of the lifestyle-related cancers. Hence,
7This may be related to a phenomenon reported by a number of studies, that women are more likely to
donate than men (see, e.g., Andreoni, Brown and Rischall, 2003, and Piper and Schnepf, 2008).
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Prediction 3. Healthier lifestyle positively correlates with allocating more to the hereditary
cancer.
Since many people have significant and regular concerns about cancer and its causes and
people are continuously exposed to public news and information about hazards of various
cancers, we might expect the elicited likelihoods to be close to the actual likelihoods. More-
over, as we argued above, given the multitude of expert opinions about these likelihoods, we
expect the respondents to perceive a significant amount of ambiguity. Thus,
Prediction 4. Respondents perceive cancer rates as ambiguous and their probability intervals
include the actual rates.
Finally and as was mentioned above, the scale of risk proposed by Gardoni and Murphy
(2014) is based on three supposedly independent dimensions: consequences, probability, and
the source of the risk. Therefore, in line with this hypothesized relationship, we expect
no correlation between the degree of ambiguity (part of their probability dimension) and
sensitivity to responsibility (part of their source of risk dimension). That is,
Prediction 5. The degree of ambiguity has no effect on allocations.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the methods. The
empirical model and its findings are presented in Section 3. In Section 4 we draw conclusions
from our empirical findings and compare them to the model’s predictions. In the last section
we suggest a number of avenues for future research.
2 Methods
2.1 Survey Data
2.1.1 Sampling Procedure and Participants
The study was conducted in November 24-28, 2014 using the online survey platform Maxim-
iles. The participants were compensated with loyalty points for participating in the study.
These points were issued in real time and could be redeemed immediately for various prod-
ucts (such as books, airline tickets, etc.).
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A total of 166 valid responses were obtained out of a group of 203 respondents recruited
from the UK general population.8 Information on the socio-demographic characteristics of
the respondents, including their gender, age bands, education level, household size, income
level and number of children, were collected. Table I provides a summary of the background
and demographics data for our sample.
Table I reveals that our sample is balanced exactly with respect to gender. All age
groups have a significant representation in our sample. The individuals in 29-39 and 40-49
age groups each constitute 19% of the sample, the individuals in 18-28 age group make up
8% of the sample while the individuals who are over 70 years old are 13% of the sample. In
terms of the highest level of education, 31% of the respondents finished a secondary school,
19% finished a vocational school, and 22% of the sample had a Bachelor’s degree. Finally,
67% of the sample had income in the range of £ 20,001-£ 80,000 and 25% had income below
£ 20,000.
2.1.2 Choice Questions and Descriptive Statistics
To elicit how charitable giving may be affected by sensitivity to responsibility, the respon-
dents faced a series of hypothetical choice questions (see Appendix B). For two of the choice
questions, the prevention and treatment questions, the respondents were asked to allocate
$100 between two alternatives. For the first of these questions, the choice pertained to the
allocation between research on the prevention of hereditary versus lifestyle-related cancers,
while for the second question, it was between research on the treatment of hereditary versus
lifestyle-related cancers. The third choice question, coined the hazard question, asked the
participants how they would allocate some fixed amount of money between a smoker and
non-smoker who both have been exposed to a lung cancer hazard. To reduce potential order
effects, we randomly mixed the order in which questions were presented.
8“Catch”trial questions preceded the main body of the survey and only data for the respondents who
paid suffi cient attention was retained. In some of the survey questions, the respondents were asked to choose
minimum and maximum values for a certain variable. If they ignored the instructions that “the minimum
should be less than the maximum”, they were removed from the sample (31 respondents). There were also
6 respondents who failed to answer at least one of the choice questions.
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To avoid biasing the respondents toward one of the causes, we chose the equal division
between the alternatives as the default allocation for all choice questions.9 The deviations of
the respondents’selections from this default are denoted by yp, yt and yh for the prevention,
treatment and hazard questions, respectively. In what follows, we will call these variables
as allocations relative to the default or, simply, relative allocations. Positive values of these
variables reflect preference for giving to the hereditary cancers in the case of variables yp and
yt and to non-smokers in the case of variable yh.
The sample statistics for the three relative allocations are reported in Table II. From the
first column of the table it follows that the aggregate donation to the hereditary cancers
is about twice the aggregate donation to the lifestyle-related cancers (65-67% vs. 33-35%).
Table II also reveals that 64%-66% of the respondents allocated a strictly larger share to
the prevention and treatment of hereditary cancers while 12%-13% strictly preferred the
lifestyle-related cancers. For the hazard question, 67% of the respondents strictly favored
the non-smoker and only 3% strictly favored the smoker. The percentages of the respondents
who chose the equal split were 22% for the prevention question, 22% for the treatment
question, and 30% for the hazard question. Note that a small minority of the subjects chose
negative relative allocations. As will become clear shortly, a number of factors, including
family history, risk perceptions and individual health-related choices, may have contributed
to such decisions.
2.1.3 Causal Factors
In addition to the three allocation questions, we have elicited information on several factors
that may affect the respondents’answers to the choice questions. First, we categorized the
respondents according to their awareness of two highly publicized cancer cases. We asked
them whether they have knowledge of Angelina Jolie’s decision to take preventive actions
against a hereditary cancer and Sean Connery’s treatment for ailment which was likely to be
a lifestyle-related cancer. In 2013, Angelina Jolie, an actress and humanitarian, revealed in
9Given the tendency of some individuals to choose the default allocation, by selecting the 50:50 as the
default we are stacking the deck against the view that respondents value responsibility.
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a New York Times article that she took a preventive double mastectomy10 after learning she
had an estimated 87% risk of developing breast cancer due to an inherited defective gene,
BRCA1. In her case, the chance of developing breast cancer dropped to under 5% after the
surgery. The share of the respondents who knew about this or similar cases was substantial
(84%). In 1993, it was revealed that Sean Connery, who is probably best known for his
role as the first James Bond, had received radiation therapy for undisclosed throat ailment.
This news sparked media reports that the actor was suffering from throat cancer following
years of heavy smoking (he started smoking when he was nine years old). The respondents
who knew about this or similar cases were not as many as in Angelina Jolie’s case (only
34%).11 One expects that individuals who are aware of these cases have more knowledge
about hereditary and lifestyle-related cancers and their potential causes and consequences.
The proportions of the respondents in our sample who had suffered from cancer or had rel-
atives who had cancer were 6.6% and 63.9%, respectively. The respondents’self-descriptions
of lifestyles were recorded on a five-point scale (1 = very healthy to 5 = very unhealthy).
The average score for this variable was 2.6. We also categorized the participants as smokers
or non-smokers because we hypothesized that the respondents in these groups might exhibit
favoritism toward individuals from the same group. The proportion of smokers in our sample
is 18.1%, which is very close to the proportion of the wider UK population (HSCIC, 2015).
The survey also elicited the respondents’perceived individual likelihoods of getting var-
ious cancers: the overall likelihood of getting cancer and the likelihoods of getting either a
hereditary or a lifestyle-related cancer. The respondents were also asked to provide their
estimates of the percentage of UK population that gets cancer in their lifetime and the per-
centages, out of all possible cancers, of the cancers related to hereditary and lifestyle causes.
For each of these six questions, the respondents could choose between intervals of estimates
and single estimates. As was noted above, the degree of ambiguity (the difference between
the maximal and minimal likelihoods for each question) was used to measure a respondent’s
perceived ambiguity about the corresponding hazard. Table III reports the descriptive sta-
10Preventive double mastectomy is a prophylactic surgery of removing both breasts to reduce the risk of
breast cancer in women.
11Our choice of these two individuals was based on a pilot study that attempted to identify well-known
cancer cases that involved celebrities.
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tistics for the minimum, which is equal to the minimal likelihood estimate, and degree of
ambiguity variables. We have also obtained estimates of the respondents’cancer risk fac-
tor perceptions (CRUK, 2011) which included the minimum and maximum benefits from
avoiding risk factors.
2.2 The Theoretical Model
Some of our assumptions seem straightforward. Such is, for example, the assertion that an
individual who values responsibility would allocate more to the hereditary cancer. Indeed,
questioning it may sound too pedantic when no imprecise variables, like ambiguous probabil-
ities, intervene. However, in real life probabilities are not precise and hence such assertions
should be formalized and verified.
This is what we do in Appendix A, where we present a theoretical model that analyzes
the behavior of individuals who face allocation problems similar to the ones appearing in the
survey. To emphasize the distinction between the survey and the theoretical model, we do
not refer to these individuals as “respondents”in this subsection.12 We start with a simple
situation, in which no ambiguity exists, and we add it later on.
The first proposition deals with a situation in which the donation contributes to the
effectiveness of cancer treatment. That is, the donation goes toward cancer research which
increases the corresponding patients’probability of survival.
Proposition 1 Suppose that an individual is given $100 to allocate between the hereditary
and lifestyle-related cancers, where both sums are for research that improves the treatment of
the disease and no ambiguity exists. Then
(a) an individual who does not value responsibility allocates equal amounts to both types of
12Note that our setup is different from that in Fishburn and Sarin (1994, 1997) and Van Koten, Ortmann,
and Babicky (2013). In contrast to these papers, we explicitly model the link between the individuals’
actions and the probability distribution over outcomes and consider how such link may affect sensitivity to
responsibility. On the other hand, Fishburn and Sarin (1994, 1997) examine various notions of fairness in the
presence of social risks that are side-stepped in the present paper. Van Koten, Ortmann, and Babicky (2013)
provide an experimental investigation of the relationship between risk aversion and inequality aversion that
are not considered in our study either.
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cancer;
(b) an individual who values responsibility allocates a larger amount to the hereditary cancers.
Proposition 2 deals with a situation in which ambiguity exists and the donation con-
tributes to research to prevent cancer. In accordance with our questionnaire and for the
reasons mentioned above, we assume that the individuals’beliefs about the cancer rates are









respectively, the minimal and maximal cancer rates for cancer i.
Proposition 2 Suppose that an individual is given $100 to allocate between the hereditary
and lifestyle-related cancers, where both sums are for research that improves prevention of the
disease, and assume that all individuals have common beliefs about the cancer rates. Then:
(a) an individual who does not value responsibility allocates more (less) to the hereditary
cancer than to the lifestyle-related cancer if, and only if, the maximal cancer rate of the
hereditary cancer is less (more) than the maximal rate of the lifestyle-related cancer;
(b) an individual who values responsibility contributes to the hereditary cancer more than an
individual who does not value responsibility;
(c) an increase in the degree of ambiguity of cancer i’s rate, holding the mid point of the
likelihood interval constant, decreases the amount that both individual types allocate to the
prevention of this cancer;
Parts (a) and (b) of Proposition 2 imply that if all individuals have identical beliefs
and all believe that the maximal cancer rates of the two cancers are the same, then only
individuals who value responsibility will donate a larger share of their $100 to the hereditary
cancer. Assuming that, in a given set of individuals, some value responsibility, then the
aggregate donation for the hereditary cancer must be larger than for the lifestyle-related
cancer. Moreover, if both types believe that the maximal cancer rate of the lifestyle-related
cancer is greater than that of the hereditary cancer, then this relation is exacerbated with
even a higher proportion of individuals giving more to the hereditary cancer.
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3 The Empirical Model and its Results
We first examine the differences across the respondents’attitudes toward the role of potential
beneficiaries’in affecting the likelihood of a cancer (see Table II for the descriptive statistics
of the choice questions). The results of both Wilcoxon sign-rank test and t-test indicate that
the relative allocations yp, yt and yh are all significantly different from zero (p = 0.00 for
both tests). The statistical tests also indicate that the respondents prefer to contribute more
to the hereditary cancer (in the prevention and treatment questions) and to non-smokers (in
the hazard question).
Result 1. The respondents allocated significantly more to the hereditary cancer (in the pre-
vention and treatment questions) and non-smokers (in the hazard question).
The relative allocations in our survey don’t differ across the prevention, treatment, and
hazard questions. All of the differences are found to be statistically insignificant (Wilcoxon
signed-rank tests yield p = 0.27 for the comparison of the prevention and treatment questions,
p = 0.66 for the prevention and hazard questions, and p = 0.98 for the treatment and hazard
questions).
Our second result deals with how smoking status affects the relative allocations. As one
may have expected, the non-smokers tend to give more to the alternatives with less individual
responsibility (p = 0.00 for Wilcoxon sign-rank test and t-test in all three choice situations).
Somewhat unexpectedly, smokers still tend to give more to the hereditary cancers in the
prevention question, and more to the nonsmokers in the hazard question (p = 0.01 and
0.02, respectively, for the Wilcoxon sign-rank test). For the treatment question, the null
hypothesis that the smokers are indifferent between hereditary and lifestyle-related cancers,
however, cannot be rejected. Furthermore, we find that the smokers tend to give more to the
lifestyle-related cancers in the treatment question than in the prevention question (p = 0.01
for the Wilcoxon sign-rank test).
The Mann-Whitney test reveals that the smokers on average allocate less to cancers with
less individual responsibility (p = 0.07 for the prevention question, 0.00 for the treatment
question and 0.00 for the hazard question, respectively), compared to the non-smokers. We
summarize these findings in the following:
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Result 2. The non-smokers allocated significantly more than the smokers to the cancer with
less individual responsibility. However, the smokers still allocated significantly more to the
hereditary cancer than to the lifestyle-related cancer in the prevention question and allocated
significantly more to the non-smokers in the hazard question.
We now turn to exploring the effects of other individual characteristics on the respondents’
relative allocations (see Table III for the descriptive statistics of these characteristics). Note
that the relative allocations belong to the interval [−50%, 50%] for each of the three choice
questions. Since the relative allocations are censored at 50%, we used the Tobit model
(Tobin, 1958) in our estimation. We let y∗i (i = p, t, h) denote the unobserved latent variable
which corresponds to the observed variable yi (Greene, 1997):
yi =

−50 if y∗i 6 −50
y∗i if − 50 6 y∗i 6 50
50 if y∗i > −50
.
We separately estimated the following version of the Tobit model for each of the three
questions:13




iγ + εi, (1)
where Ci is the vector of all continuous variables (likelihood perceptions and risk factor
perceptions variables, Table III), and Di is the vector of all dummy variables and dummy-
coded categorical variables (group identity and socio-demographic data variables, Table III).
In the estimation, we accounted for heteroskedasticity by using White’s (1980) estimator
(see also Cameron and Trivedi, 2010). The main regression results are reported in Table
IV.14
13Since the relative allocations were chosen contemporaneously, the disturbances in the estimated equa-
tions for the three choice questions may be correlated. To investigate this possibility, the equations in (1)
were estimated simultaneously as a system, using the seemingly unrelated regression technique (Zellner,
1962). The results were similar to the case of a separate estimation.
14Multicollinearity is not a cause for concern since the variance inflation factors for all of our variables
are below 4.
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The estimation of equation (1) yields a number of interesting findings. None of the socio-
demographic characteristics are statistically significant in affecting the relative allocations
for the treatment and hazard questions while gender and income are the only statistically
significant effects for the prevention question. It was estimated that, compared to men,
women donate $8.06 more to the hereditary cancers in the prevention question. Finally,
we found that the respondents with more financial means donate significantly more to the
hereditary cancers in the prevention question; an estimated increase of $3.17 as a result of
an increase of $20, 000 in the income category.
Result 3. Women and respondents in relatively high-income categories allocate more to the
hereditary cancer in the prevention question.
Behavior is also sensitive to the respondents’degrees of ambiguity. To the best of our
knowledge, this channel has been overlooked in the existing literature and ours is the first
study to connect donation behavior with perceived ambiguity of cancer risk. The estimation
reveals that a 1 unit increase in the degree of ambiguity of the lifestyle-related cancer in
the UK leads to $0.36 decrease in the allocation to lifestyle-related cancer in the prevention
question and to $0.30 decrease in the treatment question.
Result 4. The respondents allocated less to the prevention and treatment of the lifestyle-
related cancer when they perceived a relatively large degree of ambiguity.
The respondents’awareness of highly publicized cancer cases had a statistically signifi-
cant impact on the corresponding relative allocations. The respondents who were aware of
Angelina Jolie’s or similar cases are estimated to invest 16.50% more in the treatment of the
hereditary cancers. Similarly, the respondents who were aware of Sean Connery’s or similar
cases are estimated to invest 6.98% more in the prevention of the lifestyle-related cancers.
Thus, possessing information of this nature positively affects the corresponding donation
irrespective of whether the cancer in question is hereditary or lifestyle-related.
Result 5. Knowledge of highly publicized cases affects the relative allocations in favor of the
publicized cancer type.
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Our estimation results suggest that the respondents’personal history does not affect the
relative allocations. A possible explanation for this phenomenon is the small proportion of
the respondents (6.6%) who reported relevant personal history.
In contrast to personal history, a much larger share of the participants in our survey
reported that one or more of their family members suffered from cancer (about 64%). It was
found that having a family history of cancer results in a statistically significant decrease of
9.28% in the donation to the hereditary cancers for the treatment question. The effects of a
family history for the other two questions are statistically insignificant.
Our estimation results show that the relative allocations were affected by the respondents’
perceptions of own lifestyles. The less healthy the respondents’self-described lifestyle, the
more she/he allocated to the smokers in the hazard question. Specifically, a 1 unit decrease in
the self-reported healthiness of lifestyle, represented by a 1 unit increase in the corresponding
index, is estimated to lead to a statistically significant increase of $4.27 in the amount
allocated to the smokers.
As one could have also expected, the smoking status impacted the respondents’relative
allocations. Compared to the non-smokers in our sample, the smokers are estimated to
allocate $12.48 more to the lifestyle-related cancers in the treatment question and $11.97
more to the smoker in the hazard question.
Result 6. The amount allocated to the smoker in the hazard question is larger for the
respondents who reported smoking compared to the non-smokers as well as for the respondents
who reported a relatively unhealthy lifestyle.
The relationship between the respondents’donations and their perceptions of contracting
cancer themselves reveals that self-interest plays an important role in their choices. A 1
unit increase in a respondent’s perceived minimal likelihood of contracting a lifestyle-related
cancer herself/himself leads to an estimated $0.47 increase in the donation to the lifestyle-
related cancer in the prevention question.
Result 7. The respondents exhibit a certain degree of self-interest in their choices by allo-
cating more to the lifestyle-related cancer in the prevention question, when they perceive a
larger minimal individual likelihood of contracting this cancer.
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The respondents risk factor perceptions also affect their choices. For a 1% increase in the
perceived minimum benefits from avoiding risk factors, the share allocated to hypothetical
smokers decreased by 0.17% in the hazard question.
4 Discussion
In this section we draw conclusions from our empirical findings and compare them to the
model’s predictions. We conclude the section with a short discussion of the limitations of
our analysis.
4.1 Attitudes towards Responsibility
Except for the smokers in the treatment question, less than 14% of the respondents allocated
larger sums to the lifestyle-related cancer. This seems to confirm Prediction 1. Furthermore,
except for this group-question combination, the hypothesis that negative values of yp, yt and
yh are significant is always rejected.
Following the theoretical results of Propositions 1 and 2, Result 1 may suggest that the
allocation of a considerable share of the respondents is affected by the perception of others’
perceived irresponsible behavior. In the treatment scenario, for example, about two-thirds
of the respondents allocated more to the hereditary cancer. Hence, if most of them are
impartial, i.e. if they can detach themselves from the decision problem and ignore potential
self-interested motives, then valuing responsibility may be the reason behind their choice.15
The situation with respect to prevention is less revealing since, on average, people perceive
the lifestyle-related cancer to have a higher cancer rate and hence, following Proposition 2
part (b), even respondents who do not value responsibility will allocate more to the hereditary
cancer.16
The conclusion that a considerable share of the population may value responsibility is
15As correctly pointed out by an anonymous reviewer, there could be another expanation for Result 1. It
might be that the respondents’allocations reflect views about which research ought to be prioritized, rather
than views about the cancer patients and their behavior.




c − p0hc ≈ p̄
0l
c − p0lc .
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further supported by analyzing the answers of the smokers’group. Consider the extreme
case where all respondents follow their self-interests and allocate more to the hazards that
directly affect them. In this case, the smokers would donate more than 50 to the lifestyle
cancer and we would expect all yis (i = p, t, h) to be negative among them. However, in all
questions at least 30% of the smokers chose positive yi, thus ignoring their self-interests and
positive attitudes towards fellow smokers. Summarizing, allocating more to the hereditary
cancer by these respondents may well suggest that they also value responsibility. Finally,
since it may be reasonable to assume that valuing responsibility is independent of smoking
behavior, the above conclusion may indicate that at least 30% of the whole population values
responsibility.
Similarly, Result 3 may suggest that women and high-income earners are more likely
to value responsibility. The finding regarding women confirms Prediction 2 and, as noted
there, a previous observation that sensitivity to responsibility is mainly driven by women
(see Melkonyan, Safra and Ma, 2017). The finding regarding high-income earners is new.
Finally, Table II reveals that the shares of the respondents who allocated more to the
prevention and treatment of the hereditary cancers were quite similar (66.3% in the pre-
vention vs. 63.9% in the treatment). However, as we mentioned above and demonstrate in
Appendix A (Proposition 2, part (b)), even respondents who do not value responsibility are
expected to behave in this way in the prevention scenario. Therefore, this finding may sug-
gest that allocating more to the hereditary cancer is context-dependent, and that it is more
prevalent in the treatment situation. One possible explanation is as follows. It is sensible to
expect that individuals experience more emotions when contemplating treatment compared
to prevention. The former may be associated with intense feelings related to specific indi-
viduals suffering from cancer or images of cancer patients seen in real life or media. The
latter may not trigger such strong response as it is likely to be associated with future cancer
sufferers only. Thus, our results may suggest that allocating more to the hereditary cancer,
and perhaps valuing responsibility, is not emotion-free.
18
4.2 Self-interest and In-group Favoritism
As Results 2, 6 and 7 demonstrate, the respondents exhibit a significant degree of self-interest
and in-group favoritism. The respondents who reported smoking, or having a relatively un-
healthy lifestyle, allocated more to smokers, in accordance with Prediction 3. Furthermore,
the respondents allocated more to the cancers which they perceived to be riskier for them-
selves. Such behavioral pattern is not very surprising, although one would expect it to be
less prevalent in decisions involving donations, where the emphasis is on giving to others.
The findings that the smokers tend to give more to the lifestyle-related cancers in the
treatment question than in the prevention question (reported before Result 2) have some
interesting implications. The smokers will tend to allocate more money to the treatment of
the lifestyle-related cancer than to the hereditary cancer if they believe that such treatment
will benefit them and perceive a high likelihood of needing such treatment. Our findings
suggest that the smokers’perceptions of such direct benefit to themselves are sizeable. This
kind of direct effect is muted for the prevention question if a large share of the smokers
perceive programs to prevent “bad”behavior (such as smoking and excessive drinking) as
ineffective or do not have intentions of changing their behavior. The results of the statistical
test for the prevention question suggest that a considerable share of the smokers possess at
least one of these two beliefs. Regarding the hazard question, since it deals with a group of
smokers to which even the smokers in our sample do not belong, the fact that they allocate
more to the non-smokers in this question suggests that the feelings of camaraderie and social
identity with fellow smokers are relatively weak.
Two other channels may explain the disproportionate allocation of money toward the
non-smoker in the hazard question. First, it may in part be due to the desire of the subjects
to compensate the individuals affected by the exposure to smoking rather than other causes.
Second, the smokers may feel sympathy and identification with future victims and, as a
result, donate more to the lifestyle-related cancer.17
17We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for bringing these two channels to our attention.
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4.3 Ambiguity
Our empirical results reveal that the respondents perceived a significant level of ambiguity.
This is reflected by the size of their declared interval probabilities. On average, the size of
these intervals is around one quarter (0.2-0.28) of the whole probability interval [0, 1]. As for
the effect of ambiguity on the respondents’choices, from Result 4 and in accordance with
part (c) of Proposition 2, an increase in the degree of ambiguity of the lifestyle-related cancer
rate has a negative effect on the amount allocated to the prevention of this cancer. When
we examined a possible correlation between ambiguity and allocating more to the hereditary
cancer, we found that for the smokers, the difference between the degree of ambiguity of
the respondents who allocated more to the hereditary cancer and the rest is insignificant
(p = 0.20, Mann-Whitney test). These findings partially confirm Prediction 5.
As can be seen in Table III, the respondents’perceptions about the likelihoods of getting
a cancer (both for the UK population and for themselves) are in line with the estimates of
the corresponding likelihoods based on incidence data. According to the Cancer Research
UK (2017), the lifetime risk of getting a cancer is estimated at 50%, which falls in the
(average) interval stated by the respondents. With conditional likelihoods of getting these
types of cancers, the answers are only partially true. The estimated conditional likelihood
of getting a lifestyle-related cancer in the UK in 2015 was 38%. Although this value falls in
the stated interval, its complement (62%) does not fall in its corresponding interval. Hence,
our empirical findings partially confirm Prediction 4.
4.4 Familiarity effect
Result 5 is consistent with previous studies, where media coverage has been found to be
positively related to prosocial behavior toward the reported issue (see, e.g., Simon, 1997;
Brown and Minty, 2008). There are a number of potential drivers of this relationship.
Preferences over donations to a cause may depend on various types of information about
that cause. In our context, this information may pertain, for example, to the group affected
by the disease and the urgency of the need (see, e.g., Bekkers and Wiepking, 2011).
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Media coverage may also decrease the “social distance”18 between beneficiaries and
donors. The closer the social distance, the stronger the empathy. When a disease has
been covered by the media, respondents may feel connected with its (potential) victims.
As a result, these victims may become “identifiable”and no longer be perceived as simply
unknown or “statistical”lives (Schelling, 1968).
4.5 Limitations
Our analysis has certain limitations. First, the choice questions in our study are hypothetical.
One might question whether respondents would behave similarly if they dealt with actual
money and actual cancer causes. It would be very interesting to conduct field, laboratory, or
online experiments where individuals were choosing how to allocate actual money between
specific hereditary and lifestyle-related cancers or between some other specific causes that
are differentiated by the degree of the beneficiaries’responsibility.
Another limitation of our study is the relatively small sample size and its representa-
tiveness. One could forward an argument that individuals who participate in surveys in
exchange for money or products might have prevalence of certain characteristics. However,
it is hard to identify any a priori reasons that individuals who participated in the study have
a characteristic that correlates with the answers to the survey questions. In addition, since
an online experiment like ours targets a broad population, it offers a sensible route to over-
come a sample representativeness problem that is common to many laboratory experiments
(which usually use student populations).
Another potential disadvantage of the setup in the present paper is that donations are
made on the respondents’behalf rather by the respondents themselves. Individuals may
behave differently with respect to their own money than with respect to somebody else’s.
One way, albeit imperfect, to circumvent this shortcoming is to endow individuals with some
amount of money and then ask them whether and how much they would like to donate to
the causes proposed by the experimenter.19
18According to Loewenstein and Small (2007), social distance refers to “feelings of connection (or lack
thereof) between two individuals”.
19This procedure is also imperfect because people may exhibit different behavior with respect to windfall
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Finally, there is strong evidence that a non-negligible share of population believes (pos-
sibly as a psychological coping mechanism) that people get what they deserve: good things
tend to happen to good people and bad things to bad people (Furnham, 2003, Hafer and
Sutton, 2016). One may naturally wonder about the relationship between such “beliefs in
a just world”(BJS) and preferences and behavior exhibited in environments similar to that
considered in the present paper. For example, one could contemplate that people with strong
BJS may favor causes where choices play a bigger role than bad luck (because they believe
that bad luck “justifiably”affects bad people). It is also possible to envision a scenario where
people with BJS are indifferent between luck and choices as causes of adverse outcomes. The
possibilities for the relationship between BJS and preferences over charitable contributions
as a function of risky behavior, as well as the causes of such relationship, are abundant and
we leave it to future research.
5 Future Research
The current work opens up a number of avenues for future research. It would be very
interesting to conduct a similar study using as the subject pool healthcare professionals and
those among them who are in charge of formulating and implementing healthcare policies.
Taking this design to other contexts, such as the financial sector, could also prove fruitful.
Finally, constructing a study where responsibility views are compared to “warm glow”and,
more generally, to impure altruism would undoubtedly shed new light on the importance of
all these behavioral traits and prove useful in guiding future policies.
and hard earned money.
22
References
[1] Andreoni, J, Brown, E, Rischall, I. Charitable giving by married couples who decides
and why does it matter? Journal of Human Resources, 2003; 38(1):111-33.
[2] Akerlof GA, Kranton RE. Economics and identity. Quarterly Journal of Economics,
2000 Aug; 115(3):715-53.
[3] Babicky, V, Ortmann, A, Van Koten, S. Fairness in Risky Environments: Theory and
Evidence, CERGE-EI Working Papers wp419, 2010; The Center for Economic Research
and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
[4] Bekkers R, Wiepking P. A literature review of empirical studies of philanthropy: eight
mechanisms that drive charitable giving. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly,
2011 Oct;40(5):924-73.
[5] Brown PH, Minty JH. Media coverage and charitable giving after the 2004 Tsunami.
Southern Economic Journal, 2008; Jul:75(1):9-25.
[6] Bulman, RJ, Wortman, CB. Attributions of blame and coping in the “real world”:
severe accident victims react to their lot. Journal of personality and social psychology,
1977; 35(5), p. 351.
[7] Buyx, AM. Personal responsibility for health as a rationing criterion: why we don’t like
it and why maybe we should. Journal of medical ethics, 2008; 34(12), pp.871-874.
[8] Cameron, AC, Trivedi PK. Microeconometrics using stata. Revised edition. College
Station, Texas: Stata press; 2010. Chapter 16, Tobit and selection models; p. 535-66.
[9] Cancer Research UK (CRUK). Cancer awareness measure toolkit version 2.1. 2011 Feb
9. Available from: http://www.cancerresearchuk.org/sites/default/files/health_
professional_cancer_awareness_measure_toolkit_version_2.1_09.02.11.pdf.
[10] CRUK. Cancer risk statistics [cited 2017 Jan 20]. Avaiable from:
http://www.cancerresearchuk.org/health-professional/cancer-statistics/risk.
23
[11] Cappelen AW, Hole AD, Sørensen EØ, Tungodden B. The pluralism of fairness ideals:
an experimental approach. The American Economic Review, 2007 Jun;97(3):818-27.
[12] Cappelen AW, Konow J, Sørensen EØ, Tungodden B. Just luck: An experimental study
of risk-taking and fairness. The American Economic Review, 2013 Jun;103(4):1398-1413.
[13] Cappelen, AW, Norheim, OF. Responsibility in health care: a liberal egalitarian ap-
proach. Journal of medical ethics, 2005; 31(8):476-480.
[14] Cappelen AW, Sørensen EØ, Tungodden B. Responsibility for what? Fairness and
individual responsibility. European Economic Review, 2010 Apr;54(3):429-41.
[15] Chen, Y, Li. SX. Group identity and social preferences. The American Economic Review,
2009 Mar;99(1):431-57.
[16] Cohen C, Benjamin M. Alcoholics and liver transplantation. The Ethics and Social
Impact Committee of the Transplant and Health Policy Center. JAMA 1991;265:1299-
301.
[17] Curley, SP, Yates, JF, Abrams, RA. Psychological sources of ambiguity avoidance. Or-
ganizational behavior and human decision processes, 1986; 38(2):230-256.
[18] Daniels N. Just health: meeting health needs fairly. New York: Cambridge University
Press, 2008.
[19] Duff, RA. Answering for crime: Responsibility and liability in the criminal law. Blooms-
bury Publishing, 2007.
[20] Ellsberg D. Risk, ambiguity, and the Savage axioms. The Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics, 1961 Nov; 1:643-69.
[21] Feiring E. Lifestyle, responsibility and justice. Journal of Medical Ethics. 2008 Jan
1;34(1):33-6.
[22] Fishburn, PC, Sarin, RK. Fairness and Social Risk I: Unaggregated Analyses. Manage-
ment Science, 1994; 40(9):1174-1188.
24
[23] Fishburn, PC, Sarin, RK. Fairness and Social Risk II: Aggregated Analyses. Manage-
ment Science, 1997; 43(1):15-26.
[24] Flage, R, Aven, T, Zio, E, Baraldi, P. Concerns, challenges, and directions of develop-
ment for the issue of representing uncertainty in risk assessment. Risk Analysis, 2014;
34(7):1196-1207.
[25] Fong, C. Social preferences, self-interest, and the demand for redistribution. Journal of
Public Economics, 2001; 82:225-246.
[26] Friedman LC, Romero C, Elledge R, Chang J, Kalidas M, Dulay MF, Lynch GR, Os-
borne CK. Attribution of blame, self-forgiving attitude and psychological adjustment
in women with breast cancer. Journal of behavioral medicine. 2007 Aug 1;30(4):351-7.
[27] Furnham, A. Belief in a just world: Research progress over the past decade. Personality
and individual differences, , 2003; 34(5):795-817.
[28] Gardoni, P, Murphy, C. A scale of risk. Risk Analysis, 2014; 34(7):1208-1227.
[29] Gilboa I, Schmeidler D. Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior. Journal of
Mathematical Economics, 1989; 18(2):141-53.
[30] Greene, WH. Econometric analysis. 3rd ed. New Jersey: Prentice Hall; 1997. Chapter
20.3, Censored data; p. 959-74.
[31] Gulyn LM, Youssef F. Attribution of blame for breast and lung cancers in women.
Journal of Psychosocial Oncology. 2010 May 3;28(3):291-301.
[32] Hafer, CL, Sutton, R. Belief in a just world. In Handbook of social justice theory and
research. Sabag, C. and Schmitt, M. eds., 2016. (pp. 145-160). Springer, New York, NY.
[33] Han PK, Moser RP, Klein WM. Perceived ambiguity about cancer prevention recom-
mendations: relationship to perceptions of cancer preventability, risk, and worry. Jour-
nal of health communication, 2006; Feb 1;11(S1):51-69.
25
[34] Han, PK, Moser, RP and Klein, WM. Perceived ambiguity about cancer prevention
recommendations: associations with cancer-related perceptions and behaviours in a US
population survey. Health Expectations, 2007; 10(4):321-336.
[35] Hansson, SO. Managing risks of the unknown. In Risk Analysis of Natural Hazards,
2016; 155-172. Springer International Publishing.
[36] Health & Social Care Information Centre (HSCIC). Statistics on smoking: England
2015. 2015 May 29. Available from:
http://www.hscic.gov.uk/catalogue/PUB17526/stat-smok-eng-2015-rep.pdf.
[37] Johnson BB, Slovic P. Presenting uncertainty in health risk assessment: initial studies
of its effects on risk perception and trust. Risk analysis, 1995; Aug 1;15(4):485-94.
[38] Keller, LR, and Sarin, RK. Equity in social risk: Some empirical observations. Risk
Analysis, 1988; 8(1):135-146.
[39] Loewenstein G, Small DA. The Scarecrow and the Tin Man: the vicissitudes of human
sympathy and caring. Review of General Psychology, 2007 Jun;11(2):112-26.
[40] Melkonyan T, Safra Z, Ma S. Justice in an uncertain world: Evidence on donations to
cancer research. University of Warwick; 2017 Working Paper.
[41] Mikula, G. Testing an attributionâ€ofâ€blame model of judgments of injustice. Euro-
pean Journal of Social Psychology, 2003; 33(6):793-811.
[42] Moss, AH, Siegler, M. Should alcoholics compete equally for liver transplantation?.
Jama. 1991;265:1295-8.
[43] Piper, G, Schnepf, SV. Gender differences in charitable giving in Great Britain. Volun-
tas, 2008; 19(2):103-24.
[44] Rickard, LN. Perception of risk and the attribution of responsibility for accidents. Risk
analysis, 2014; 34(3):514-528.
26
[45] Rudman LA, and Goodwin SA. Gender differences in automatic in-group bias: Why
do women like women more than men like men? Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology. 2004 Oct;87(4):494-509.
[46] Sharkey K, Gillam L. Should patients with self-inflicted illness receive lower priority
in access to healthcare resources? Mapping out the debate. Journal of Medical Ethics.
2010 Nov 1;36(11):661-5.
[47] Schelling, TC. The life you save may be your own. In: Samuel BC, editor. Problems in
public expenditure analysis. Washington DC: The Brookings Institute; 1968. p.127-62.
[48] Schmidt H. Just health responsibility. Journal of Medical Ethics. 2009 Jan 1;35(1):21-6.
[49] Segall S. Health, luck, and justice. Princeton University Press; 2009 Sep 28.
[50] Shavell, S. Liability for harm versus regulation of safety. The Journal of Legal Studies,
1984; 13(2):357-374.
[51] Shaver, KG. The attribution of blame: Causality, responsibility, and blameworthiness.
Springer Science & Business Media, 2012.
[52] Simon AF. Television news and international earthquake relief. Journal of Communica-
tion, 1997 Sep;47(3):82-93.
[53] Sumner, WG. Folkways: A study of the sociological importance of usages, manners, cus-
toms, mores, and morals. Boston: Ginn and Company; c1906. Chapter 1, Fundamental
notions of the folkways and of the mores; p.1-74.
[54] The Guardian. Heavy drinkers to be considered for NHS liver transplants. by J. Meikle,
3 April, 2014.
[55] The Telegraph. Obese patients and smokers banned from routine surgery in ‘most severe
ever’rationing in the NHS. by Henry Bodkin, 2 September 2016.
[56] Tobin, J. Estimation of relationships for limited dependent variables. Econometrica,
1958 Jan;26(1):24-36.
27
[57] Tomasetti, C, Vogelstein, B. Variation in cancer risk among tissues can be explained by
the number of stem cell divisions. Science, 2015; 347(6217):78-81.
[58] Tversky, A, Fox, CR. Weighing risk and uncertainty. Psychological review, 1995;
102(2):269.
[59] Walley P. Statistical reasoning with imprecise probabilities. 1991. Chapman&Hill.
[60] White H. A heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimator and a direct test
for heteroskedasticity. Econometrica, 1980 May;48(4):817-38.
[61] Wolfers, J. Economists on the Bailout. Freakonomics/Nytimes.com, September 23, 2008.
[62] Wu S, Powers S, Zhu W, Hannun YA. Substantial contribution of extrinsic risk factors
to cancer development. Nature, 2016 Jan;529(7584):43.
[63] Zellner A. An effi cient method of estimating seemingly unrelated regressions and tests for




6.1 Appendix A: The Theoretical Model and its Predictions
Consider an individual who is endowed with a sum of $100 to donate to cancer research.
The sum can be allocated either to a (typical) hereditary cancer or to a (typical) lifestyle-
related cancer. We assume that the individual is impartial and a utilitarian, in the sense
that her utility is derived by adding the utilities of the potential beneficiaries (who are
cancer patients benefitting from improved treatment and a better prevention policy). In
what follows, we first consider the case of the optimal donations to cancer treatment and
then turn to the optimal donations to cancer prevention. For the first, we focus on the
case where the individual makes her choice under risk while, for the second, she makes her
decision under ambiguity.
6.1.1 Donation to Cancer Treatment (no ambiguity)
An individual allocates $100 between two projects with each affecting a distinct cancer
patient, one suffering from a hereditary cancer, denoted by h, and the other suffering from a
lifestyle-related cancer, denoted by l. To simplify our notation, we call the patients suffering
from cancers h and l patients h and l, respectively. Let di ∈ [0, 100], i = h, l, denote the
amount allocated to cancer i (therefore, if dh = d then dl = 100 − dh). The individual
assumes that her donation contributes to the effectiveness of cancer treatment. That is, the
donation goes toward cancer research which increases the corresponding patients’expected
probability of survival. The expected survival rate functions for cancers h and l are assumed,






where p0s ∈ (0, 1) denotes the (current) survival rate for both cancers. The function ps :
R+ × (0, 1) → (0, 1] is assumed to be twice continuously differentiable, strictly increasing
and strictly concave in its first argument and strictly increasing in its second argument.
The monotonicity assumptions reflect the individual’s subjective belief that (1) the expected
survival rate is increasing in the survival rate and (2) her donation has a positive effect on
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the expected survival rate. It is further assumed that the expected survival rate is equal
to the survival rate if the individual doesn’t allocate any amount to the cancer (that is,
ps (p
0
s, 0) = p
0
s). Since in the sequel the survival rates are held fixed, we simplify the notation
by using ps (d) instead of ps (d; p0s).
It is assumed that surviving a cancer, an outcome denoted by H, gives both patients,
in the eyes of the individual, a utility of one unit. That is, uh (H) = ul (H) = 1. Dying
from cancer, an outcome denoted by M , yields a lower utility. Under contingency M , the
utility of patient h as perceived by the individual is assumed to be zero; uh (M) = 0. On
the other hand, the utility attached by the individual to patient l (under contingency M)
depends on whether or not the individual thinks patient l is to blame for his cancer-inducing
behavior. To model this, let pa ∈ (0, 1) denote the individual’s perceived probability that
cancer l is induced by a specific, avoidable, lifestyle. An individual who values responsibility
realizes that unhealthy lifestyle is a decision made by supposedly informed individuals and
presumes that patients following such lifestyle care less about their possible death. Thus,
this individual assumes that the utility difference for patient l between outcomes H and M
is smaller than that for patient h. More specifically, an individual who values responsibility
assigns a positive utility pa to patient l under contingency M , ulr (M) = pa, where subscript
r stands for such an individual. Hence, the utility difference between the two outcomes is
1 − pa, and is decreasing with the lifestyle-related avoidable risk of cancer l. Thus, this
individual attributes a higher utility to adverse outcomes for self-harming individuals. An
individual who does not value responsibility assigns a utility of zero in this case: ulnr (M) = 0,
where nr is the subscript for such an individual.
An individual who does not value responsibility assigns the expected utilities EUhnr and
EU lnr to patients h and l, respectively. It follows from our assumptions that, when d
h = d,
and dl = 100− d,
EUhnr (d) = ps (d)u
h (H) + (1− ps (d))uh (M) = ps (d) , (3)
EU lnr (d) = ps (100− d)ul (H) + (1− ps (100− d))ulnr (M) = ps (100− d) .
Therefore, the utilitarian objective function of this individual is given by
Vnr (d) = EU
h
nr (d) + EU
l
nr (d) = ps (d) + ps (100− d) . (4)
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Similarly, the individual who values responsibility assigns the expected utilities EUhr and
EU lr to patients h and l, and
EUhr (d) = ps (d)u
h (H) + (1− ps (d))uh (M) = ps (d) , (5)
EU lr (d) = ps (100− d)ul (H) + (1− ps (100− d))ulr (M)
= ps (100− d) + pa (1− ps (100− d)) .
The utilitarian objective function Vr (d) of this individual is therefore given by
Vr (d) = EU
h
r (d) + EU
l
r (d) = Vnr (d) + pa (1− ps (100− d)) . (6)
Analyzing the optimal donations of the two individual types, we obtain the following:
Proposition 1 Suppose that an individual is given $100 to allocate between the hereditary
and lifestyle-related cancers, where both sums are for research that improves the treatment of
the disease and no ambiguity exists. Then
(a) an individual who does not value responsibility allocates equal amounts to both types of
cancer;
(b) an individual who values responsibility allocates a larger amount to the hereditary cancer.









and hence, the optimal allocation entails an equal split between the two cancer types.20






Vnr (50) + pa
dps
dd
(100− d)d=50 > 0,
which implies that the optimal allocation satisfies d > 50. Thus, the individual gives more
than 50 to the hereditary cancer and less than 50 to the lifestyle cancer. 
20The first-order condition is suffi cient by strict concavity of ps with respect to its second argument.
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6.1.2 Donations to Cancer Prevention (with ambiguity)
Similarly to the analysis for the cancer treatment case, we assume that the individual con-
siders two cancer patients, h and l, and that di ∈ [0, 100] (i = h, l) denotes the amount
allocated to cancer i. Here, the individual focuses on contributing to research to prevent
cancer and assumes that her donation positively affects the cancer prevention by decreasing
the potential patients’probability of getting the cancer. Let phc and p
l
c denote the resulting
expected cancer rates for cancers h and l, respectively. The expected cancer rates for the





for i = h, l,
where p0ic ∈ (0, 1) denotes the (current) cancer rate for cancer i (as perceived by the individ-
ual). Note that we allow for the current rates to be different. The function pc : R+×(0, 1)→
(0, 1] is assumed to be twice continuously differentiable, strictly decreasing and strictly con-
vex in its first argument and strictly increasing in its second argument. The monotonicity
assumptions reflect the individual’s subjective belief that (1) the expected cancer rate is
increasing in the cancer rate and (2) her donation can decrease the expected cancer rate. It
is further assumed that the expected cancer rate is equal to the cancer rate if the individual
doesn’t allocate any amount to cancer i (that is, pc (0; p0ic ) = p
0i
c ). Finally, we assume that
the effect of the donation on the expected cancer rate is positively related to the cancer rate:
∂2pc
∂d∂p0ic
> 0. This assumption reflects situations where an individual associates relatively inef-
fective efforts to prevent the cancer with a relatively high current rate (note that ∂pc
∂d
< 0).
That is, a high cancer rate signals to the individual that various actions to decrease the ex-
pected rate are not very productive and, as a result, she believes that increasing her donation
to such cancer will have a relatively small effect on the expected cancer rate.
In accordance with our questionnaire and for the reasons mentioned in the introduction,
we assume that the individual’s beliefs about the cancer rates for both cancers are vague, and






⊂ [0, 1], i = h, l. The end points p0i
c
and p̄0ic are
called, respectively, minimal and maximal rates for cancer i. If there are several competing







would be a singleton. In this case, the individual faces pure risk with respect
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= [0, 1]. This
represents a situation where the individual has no information on the cancer rate other than
that it falls somewhere in [0, 1]. We will call the difference p̄0ic − p0ic between the maximal
and minimal probabilities a degree of ambiguity for cancer i.
In this subsection we assume that the survival rate for both cancers is fixed and equal
to ps ∈ (0, 1). Finally, the utility assigned to the beneficiaries by both types of individuals
under the two possible outcomes, H and M, are the same as in the previous subsection.
Without loss of generality, we also assume that the utility of not getting the cancer is the
same as the utility of getting it and being cured.






(i = h, l), the expected utilities
assigned by an individual who does not value responsibility to patients h and l are denoted
by EŨhnr and EŨ
l

















h (H) + (1− ps)uh (M)
)
(7)





















l (H) + (1− ps)ulnr (M)
)
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and her utility is given by
Ṽr
(








































(i = h, l), we follow
the popular model of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) and assume that both individuals have
maxmin expected utility (MEU) preferences:
Wj(d) = min












(j = nr, r). The MEU model corresponds to complete pessimism on the individual’s part
in the sense that, when evaluating stochastic outcomes, she always uses the probability













immediately from (8) and (10) that a MEU individual will use the maximal rates for both
cancers, p̄0hc and p̄
0l
c , in her evaluation of different outcomes. Hence,























To conclude, we compare the donations of both types and obtain the effect of the degree
of ambiguity on the two individuals’donation behavior.
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Proposition 2 Suppose that an individual is given $100 to allocate between the hereditary
and lifestyle-related cancers, where both sums are for research that improves prevention of the
disease, and assume that all individuals have common beliefs about the cancer rates. Then:
(a) an individual who does not value responsibility allocates more (less) to the hereditary
cancer than to the lifestyle-related cancer if, and only if, the maximal cancer rate of the
hereditary cancer is less (more) than the maximal rate of the lifestyle-related cancer;
(b) an individual who values responsibility contributes to the hereditary cancer more than an
individual who does not value responsibility;
(c) an increase in the degree of ambiguity of cancer i’s rate, holding the mid point of the
likelihood interval constant, decreases the amount that both individual types allocate to the
prevention of this cancer;
Proof of Proposition 2: Differentiating (12) and (13), we obtain the following expressions
for the first-order condition of the two individual types:
∂
∂d












= 0 and (14)
∂
∂d
























We denote the optimal allocations of the individuals who value and do not value responsibility
by dnr and dr, respectively.
(a) Consider an individual who does not value responsibility. Since
∂
∂d































⇔ p̄0hc < p̄0lc .




















Hence at dnr, ∂∂dWr (dnr) > 0, which implies dr > dnr.
(c) First, consider cancer h and differentiate ∂
∂d
Wnr and ∂∂dWr with respect to p̄
0h
c , holding



































It then follows from the implicit function theorem that the optimal amounts dnr and dr




Next consider cancer l and differentiate ∂
∂d
Wnr and ∂∂dWr with respect to p̄
0l
c , holding






























It then follows from the implicit function theorem that dnc and dch increase with such a
change. Therefore, the amounts 100 − dnr and 100 − dr allocated to the lifestyle-related
cancers by the two types of individual decrease. 
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6.2 Appendix B: Choice Questions
– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – —
Question 1. Suppose that £ 100 would be donated on your behalf to research on cancer
treatment (such as chemotherapy and radiotherapy). Please indicate the percentage of this
amount that you would allocate to the treatment of hereditary cancers (caused by an inher-
ited genetic defect). The rest of the funds will go to the treatment of lifestyle-related cancers
(such as smoking, poor diet, and physical inactivity).
– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –
Question 2. Suppose that £ 100 would be donated on your behalf to research on cancer
prevention (such as genetic testing). Please indicate the percentage of this amount that
you would allocate to the prevention of hereditary cancers (caused by an inherited genetic
defect). The rest of the funds will go to the prevention of lifestyle-related cancers (such as
smoking, poor diet, and physical inactivity).
– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –
Question 3. Consider the following scenario. Suppose that a segment of general population
has been exposed to a cancer hazard (for example, due to negligence by some third party).
After this incident, some proportion of the exposed population contracted lung cancer. In
response to this adverse outcome, the government allocated a fixed amount of funds to
compensate the individuals that were exposed to the hazard.
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Consider the compensation scheme of the following two individuals; both were exposed
to the hazard and contracted the disease, while the first was a heavy smoker and the second
not. A fixed amount of money has been allocated to compensate these two individuals.
Please indicate the percentage of this amount that you would allocate to compensating the
smoker (the rest of the funds will go to the non-smoker):
– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –
38
6.3 Appendix C: Tables
Table I. Background and Demographics (N=166)
Variable Response Category Percentage
Gender Male 50.0
Female 50.0
Age 18-28 years old 8.4
29-39 years old 18.7
40-49 years old 18.7
50-59 years old 24.1
60-69 years old 16.9
Over 70 years old 13.3
Education Primary school 0.6
Some secondary school 3.6
Secondary school 30.7
Vocational school 18.7
Some university modules 9.0
Bachelors degree 22.3
Some graduate-level modules 4.8
Masters degree 8.4
Some doctoral-level modules 0.6
Doctorate degree 1.2
Household Live alone 25.3
Live with others 74.7
Income £ 0 to £ 20,000 25.3
£ 20,001 to £ 40,000 32.5
£ 40,001 to £ 60,000 16.9
£ 60,001 to £ 80,000 17.5
£ 80,001 to £ 100,000 6.0
Over £ 100,000 1.8
Children Have no children 38.0
Have children 62.0
39
Table II. Descriptive Statistics of Choice Questions
Task Mean Standard Median Share of Share of Share of
deviation subjects with subjects with subjects with
−50 6 yi< 0 yi= 0 0 < yi6 50
Overall
Prevention 16.26 22.92 17.00 12.05 21.69 66.27
Treatment 15.47 23.00 12.00 13.86 22.29 63.86
Hazard 17.02 18.42 16.00 3.01 30.12 66.87
Non-smokers
Prevention 17.35 23.51 20.00 12.50 16.91 70.59
Treatment 18.04 22.50 20.00 11.76 16.91 71.32
Hazard 19.68 18.76 20.00 2.21 23.53 74.26
Smokers
Prevention 11.33 19.59 0.00 10.00 43.33 46.67
Treatment 3.83 21.97 0.00 23.33 46.67 30.00
Hazard 4.97 10.40 0.00 6.67 60.00 33.33
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Table III. Means and Standard Deviations of the Independent Variables
Variable Mean Std. Variable Mean Std.
dev. dev.
Group identity Likelihood perceptions
Angelina Jolie’s case 0.843 0.365 Personal_ambiguity 0.241 0.221
Sean Connery’s case 0.343 0.476 Personal_hereditary_minimum 0.214 0.197
Personal history 0.066 0.249 Personal_hereditary_ambiguity 0.195 0.189
Family history 0.639 0.482 Personal_lifestyle-related_minimum 0.231 0.184
Personal lifestyle 2.578 0.749 Personal_lifestyle-related_ambiguity 0.204 0.177
Smoke 0.181 0.386 Risk factor perceptions
Presenting order 0.560 0.498 Avoid RFs, benefit minimum 0.292 0.150
Likelihood perceptions Avoid RFs, benefit ambiguity 0.238 0.152
UK_minimum 0.286 0.142 Socio-demographic data
UK_ambiguity 0.278 0.179 Gender_male 0.500 0.502
UK_con_hereditary_minimum 0.288 0.164 Age bands 3.620 1.504
UK_con_hereditary_ambiguity 0.218 0.142 Education level 4.723 1.831
UK_con_lifestyle-related_minimum 0.375 0.171 Household size (> 1) 0.747 0.436
UK_con_lifestyle-related_ambiguity 0.247 0.166 Income level 2.018 0.937
Personal_minimum 0.292 0.192 Number of children (> 0) 0.620 0.487
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Table IV. Regression Results From Tobit Models
Variable Prevention Treatment Hazard


































































































































































*,**,*** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
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